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A pay-as-you-go (paygo) pension program may provide intergenerational pooling of risks to 
individuals’ labor and capital income over the life cycle. By means of a model that provides 
illuminating closed form solutions, we demonstrate that the magnitude of the optimal paygo 
program and the nature of the underlying risk sharing effects are very sensitive to the chosen 
combination of risk concepts and stochastic specification of long run aggregate wage income 
growth. In an additive way we distinguish between the pooling of wage and capital risks 
within periods and two different intertemporal risk sharing mechanisms. For realistic 
parameter values, the magnitude of the optimal paygo program is largest when wage shocks 
are not permanent and individuals in any generation are considered from a pre-birth 
perspective, i.e. a “rawlsian risk sharing” perspective is adopted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing literature which dates back to at least the contributions of Enders and Lapan (1982) and 
Merton (1983), considers the potential for intergenerational risk sharing by means of pay-as-you-go 
(paygo) social security programs. This issue reflects the insight that a paygo program is in effect a 
government created asset that permits one generation to trade in the human capital returns of the next. 
If the correlation between the growth of aggregate wage income (i.e. the implicit return of the paygo 
program) and alternative capital returns are less than perfect, the paygo program may consequently 
serve to correct for incomplete financial markets. Thus, one generation can by means of a mandatory 
paygo program pool its exposure to labor- and capital income risks over the life span with the 
succeeding generation’s exposure to its labor income risk.  
Looking closer at the various analyses of design and effects of paygo programs under 
uncertainty, it turns out that the nature of the risk sharing mechanisms varies along several 
dimensions. This paper considers in particular how the risk sharing effects and mechanisms vary in 
response to alternative stochastic specifications of wage income growth, which in our long-run 
intergenerational setting is equivalent to productivity growth. As discussed in some length below, 
empirical evidence hardly offers any clear guidance to the choice between alternative wage processes 
in our context. In the previous literature on social security under uncertainty, several papers assume 
that productivity and/or wage income follow a deterministic long run trend (i.e. shocks are temporary), 
see for example Enders and Lapan (1982, 1993), Gordon and Varian (1988), and De Menil et al. 
(2006). On the other hand, a series of other contributions to the same literature assume that wage 
income follows a random walk (i.e. shocks are permanent), see for example Bohn (1997), Smetters 
(2002) and Matsen and Thøgersen (2004). Hardly any paper in this area offers a justification of the 
chosen specification or an analysis of the comparative effects, however.  
This paper also captures how the specification of risk sharing concept influences the 
intergenerational risk sharing effects of paygo programs.
1 Generally, the choice is between a 
“rawlsian” (or “ex-ante”) perspective, which considers individuals in a pre-birth position, and an 
“interim” perspective, which considers individuals’ position contingent on realized wages in their first 
part of life.
2 Some authors offer careful discussions of the two alternative risk concepts and also 
demonstrate that the risk sharing effects are sensitive to the choice between them, see in particular 
Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001), Ball and Mankiw (2001) and Wagener (2003). The interdependence 
                                                 
1 A third dimension which is also crucial for the risk sharing effects of paygo programs, is the choice between a 
fixed contribution rate and a fixed benefit rate, see Wagener (2003) and Thøgersen (1998).   
2 While the rawlsian risk concept is adopted more or less explicitly by, for example, Gordon and Varian (1988), 
Enders and Lapan (1982, 1993), Krueger and Kubler (2003) and Olovsson (2004), the interim perspective is 
captured by, for example, Hassler et al. (1997), Dutta et al. (2000), Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001) and Wagener 
(2003). We also observe that the term interim is synonymous with the terms “ex-post” and “true” as used by 
Hassler et al. and Wagener, respectively.      2
between the choice of risk concept and the stochastic specification of wage income is not addressed, 
however. 
The contribution of this paper is to investigate how the intergenerational risk sharing effects 
vary with the chosen combination of risk sharing concept and stochastic specification of wage income. 
Utilizing that a paygo program can be characterized as a “quasi”-asset and employing a model that 
combines an overlapping generations framework with a portfolio choice model based on isoelastic 
utility and loglinear approximations (see Campbell and Viceira, 2002), we derive closed form 
solutions for the optimal size of the paygo program in the various cases. The simple and intuitive 
structure of these solutions allows us to disentangle the effects of alternative specifications in an 
additive and transparent way. 
Having a two-period overlapping generations framework in mind and considering a given 
generation t, three different kinds of risk sharing effects turn out to be relevant for the design of 
optimal paygo programs: i) The pooling of generation t’s capital income risk (in the second period of 
life) with the labor income risk of generation t +1. ii) The intertemporal pooling of generation t’s 
capital income risk with its own labor income risk. iii) The intertemporal pooling of generation t’s  
labor income risk with the labor income risk of the succeeding generation t + 1. Adopting an interim 
risk sharing concept, only the first effect is relevant regardless of the stochastic specification of wages. 
On the other hand, a rawlsian perspective implies that the first and second effect is relevant when 
wages follow a random walk (with drift), while the first and third effect is relevant when wage shocks 
are temporary. In addition to the risk sharing effects, there is also a standard income effect related to 
the expected gap between the return on capital income and the growth rate of aggregate wages.  
A portfolio choice approach to social security design has recently been explored by Dutta et al. 
(2000), Persson (2002), Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) and De Menil et al. (2006). The essentially 
verbal study of Persson stresses the idea that a paygo program is a quasi-asset that should enter the 
optimal portfolio of the individual. Dutta et al. employs a simple static model with mean-variance 
preferences and derives closed form solutions for the “paygo-asset” in a case corresponding to interim 
risk sharing. De Menil et al. also studies the optimal mix between a public paygo program and private 
retirement saving. They present a rather general model which must be solved numerically.    
Matsen and Thøgersen utilize the same model framework as the present paper and derive 
optimal paygo programs under the assumption that wage shocks are permanent. This paper extends the 
paper by Matsen and Thøgersen by adding an additional, crucial dimension, namely the possibility of 
temporary wage shocks, and by focusing on comparisons between different combinations of risk 
concepts and alternative stochastic properties for wage income. 
A feature, which this paper shares with Dutta et al., De Menil et al. and Matsen and Thøgersen 
as well as for example Hassler and Lindbeck (1997) and Wagener (2003), is the assumptions that the 
relevant stochastic variables (i.e. capital returns, wage growth and population growth) are exogenous. 
This contrasts other papers that consider the risk sharing effects of paygo programs by means of   3
general equilibrium models. These contributions highlight how capital returns are endogenously 
determined by productivity, population growth and other variables, see Merton (1983) and the more 
recent papers by Storesletten et al. (1999), Krueger and Kubler(2003) and Olovsson (2004). On the 
one hand, such an approach is appealing theoretically and it seems particularly appropriate given that 
most of these papers focus on the trade-off between gains of risk sharing versus the costs caused by 
the paygo program’s adverse effect on capital accumulation. On the other hand, these general 
equilibrium models tend to be rather complex and they do not permit derivation of closed form 
solutions for the optimal paygo program in the various cases considered in the present paper. It is also 
likely, as argued by Hassler and Lindbeck (1997), that the general equilibrium approach put overly 
strong restrictions on the strength of the interdependencies between the key variables mentioned 
above. In particular the correlation between wages and capital returns are significantly lower in the 
data than predicted by standard general equilibrium models.
3     
The next section presents our model and explains the two risk sharing concepts in more detail. 
Section 3 derives optimal paygo programs in the case of interim risk sharing and shows that a time 
inconsistency problem arises when wage income shocks are temporary. Section 4 adopts the rawlsian 
risk concept. Proceeding gradually, we first disregard capital income risk and focus on the paygo 
program’s intertemporal pooling of wage income shocks only. In this case we are able to generalize 
the stochastic specification of wage income growth by introducing the possibility that the degree of 
persistence in the shocks may vary between zero (no persistence at all) to one (corresponding to 
permanent shocks). We then consider both wage and capital income shock and show how the optimal 
paygo program reflects quite different types of risk sharing effects depending on whether wage shocks 
are permanent or temporary. Section 5 presents some numerical examples and discusses key 
parameters and magnitudes involved in the analysis. We particularly comment on the empirical 
evidence regarding the correlation between wage growth and capital income defined as stock market 
returns. Finally, section 6 summarizes the findings and offers some concluding remarks. This includes 




2.  Model framework 
 
Following Matsen and Thøgersen (2004), we consider an overlapping generations economy where 
each generation has a two-period life span. Any generation t supplies inelastically one unit of labor in 
period t and enjoys retirement in period t + 1. The size of generation t is given by  t X  and population 
                                                 
3 In many calibrated general equilibrium models used for social security analysis, the trick in order to match 
empirical plausible correlations between wages and capital income, is to introduce stochastic depreciation, see 
for example Olovsson (2004), Smetters (2002) and Krueger and Kubler (2002).     4
growth is deterministic and given by  N , thus  t t X N X ) 1 ( 1 + = + . We define  t W  as the gross wage per 
unit of labor in period t.  
Wages are subject to mean-zero stochastic shocks,  t Λ , which may be permanent or 
temporary. If wage shocks are permanent, we have 
(1)  t t t W W ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 1 + + Λ + Θ + = , 
where  0 ≥ Θ  is a deterministic drift. On the other hand, if wage shocks are temporary and wages tend 
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  Abstracting from precautionary saving motives over the life cycle, we follow Gordon and 
Varian (1988), Ball and Mankiw (2001) and Matsen and Thøgersen (2004), and assume that 
individuals save their complete net wage income in the first period of life and, consequently, consume 
only in the second period. Savings is allocated between risk free saving (“bonds”) with a return 
f R , 
and risky saving (“stocks”) with a stochastic return  t R ,  0 ) ( > >
f
t R R E . 
  The two stochastic variables,  t Λ  and  t R , are lognormally, independently and identically 
distributed over time. We define  ) 1 log( t t R r + ≡ ,  ) 1 log( t t Λ + ≡ λ , ) 1 log(
f f R r + ≡ , ) 1 log( N n + ≡  
and ) 1 log( Θ + ≡ θ . Moreover, the expected excess returns are given by  ) (
f
t r E − ≡ λ μ




r r r E − ≡ μ  where E denotes expectations, while variances are denoted 
2
i σ  (i = r, λ ) and the 
covariance  λ σ r . Below, a time subscript will be attached to the expectation-operator E when 
necessary.  
We note that the growth rate of aggregate wage income,  1 + t G , which defines the implicit 






1 ) 1 ( 1 +
+ + = + .
4 Because products of lognormal 
variables are also lognormal, it follows from (1) and (1’) that  t G  is lognormal. Defining 
) 1 log( t t G g + ≡  and using (1) and (1’), it follows that 
(2)  1 1 + + + + = t t n g λ θ , 
when wage shocks are permanent, and 
(2’)  t t t n g λ λ θ − + + = + + 1 1 ,  
                                                 
4 It follows that risks related to the return on the paygo program is attributed to wage (or productivity) 
fluctuations only, and not to demographic risks. An inclusion of demographic risks in a setting like the present 
one is clearly a topic for future research - and a challenge is then to disentangle between fertility- and longevity 
risks. For a paper on social security that focuses on demographic risks, see Bohn (2001).   5
when wage shocks are temporary. As we will explain below,  ) ( 1
f
t s r g E − +  (s = t – 1, t), the variance 
2
g σ  and the covariance  rg σ  will depend on the chosen risk concept and stochastic specification of 
wages.
 5 
 The  period  t expected utility of a representative individual in generation t is given by an 






















where γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ  is the time preference rate and  1 + t C  refers to 
consumption, 




t t W R R R W C 1 1 1 ) ( 1 ) 1 ( + + + + − + + − = π ω τ . 
Here τ  is the fixed contribution rate of the pension system, 
p ω  is the portfolio share of net wage 
income invested in stocks and  1 + t π  is the replacement rate of the pension program. A useful and well 
known property of the specified utility function is that optimal portfolio shares will be independent of 
the wage level. Disregarding any initial public debt and tax-financing of other public expenditures, 
paygo-financing of the pension system implies that  ) 1 ( 1 1 + + + = t t G τ π  when we assume that the 
paygo program is completely phased in.
6 Substituting this expression into (4) and rearranging yields  








t t t R R R G R R R W C − − + − + = + = + + + + + ω τ τ , 
where we refer to 
T
t R 1 +  as the effective return on the individual’s total portfolio. It follows that τ and 
p ω τ) 1 ( −  can be interpreted as the effective portfolio shares in respectively “the paygo asset” and 
stocks. Below, we generally disregard the possibility of short positions in any asset. 
  The decision problem of the representative individual in generation t is to choose 
p ω - after 
t W  has been revealed - in order to maximize (3) subject to (5) when the pension system is given. In 
order to solve this problem, we utilize the log-linear approximation method developed by John 
Campbell and Luis Viceira, see for example Campbell and Viceira (2002). Taking logs in (5) yields 
(6) 
T
t t t r w c 1 1 + + + =   , 
                                                 
5 We assume that  ) ( 1
f
t s
r r g E − > + μ  and note that the possibility of   0 ) ( 1 < − +
f
t s r g E  does not necessarily 
imply dynamic inefficiency in a stochastic economy. We generally assume that the conditions for dynamic 
efficiency are fulfilled throughout this paper, see for example Abel et al. (1989) or Blanchard and Weil (1991) 
for a more detailed discussion of this issue.   
6 We might alternatively imagine a mixed public pension program, which is partly funded and partly paygo 
financed. If significant segments of individuals do not invest in stocks due, for example, to information 
asymmetries, there is a scope for such a mixed program, see Matsen and Thøgersen (2004).      6




t R r + + + ≡ ,  1 1 log + + = t t C c  and  t t W w log = . In order to relate 
T
t r 1 +  to  1 + t g  and  1 + t r , we 
follow Campbell and Viceira (2002: p. 27-29) and use a Taylor approximation of 
T
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Maximization of (3) is equivalent to the maximization of the log of (3). Removing the 
unnecessary constant  ) 1 /( γ δ −  and using that  1 + t C  is lognormal,
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c σ  is the variance of  1 + t c . Dividing by  γ − 1  and inserting from (6), we finally write the utility 
function of the representative individual as 




1 ) 1 ( ) ( c
f T
t t t r r w E σ γ − + − + + . 
  The representative individual in generation t chooses his optimal portfolio share 
p ω  for a 
given value of τ and after  t w  has been revealed. It follows from (7) that 
(10)  
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2 2 2 2 2 2 − + + − = . 
Substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we derive the optimal value of 





























where the asterisk denotes an optimal value. Moreover, we have used that  λ σ σ r rg =  from the decision 
perspective of the individual in both the case of permanent and temporary wage shocks, i.e. see (2) and 
                                                 
7 As discussed in more detail by Campbell and Viceira (2002: p. 32), this approximation is satisfactory even for 
our long run social security setting (see also Barberis, 2000, for details in this respect). We also note that we 
could have avoided the use of approximations simply by adopting mean-variance preferences or an exponential 
utility function with constant absolute risk aversion. As discussed in more detail by Matsen and Thøgersen 
(2004), there are at least two good reasons to resist these alternative options. First, it is well known that the 
specified isoelastic utility function with constant relative risk aversion captures far more realistic attitudes 
towards risks than these alternatives. Second, in order to design optimal pension systems, which are time 
consistent in a sense that will be discussed below, it is necessary that the derived portfolio shares are independent 
of wage fluctuations. This excludes both the alternatives.      





1 1 log , log + + + + ≡ + = t t z t t Z z Ez EZ σ .   7
(2)’ and recall that  t λ  has been revealed when the individuals takes their portfolio decision. The first 
term on the RHS of (12) captures the trade-off between the log of the expected excess return on stocks, 





r R R E + + = + + σ μ  by the result in footnote 8, and the related risks measured 
by the variance of the log returns. Lower risk aversion (γ ) and a larger paygo program (τ ) tilt this 
trade-off towards a higher 
* ) (
p ω . The second term captures that stock market investments may serve 
as a hedge towards wage risk created by the paygo system when  0 ≠ λ σ r . 
  Before we proceed to the derivation of optimal paygo programs, we will take a closer look at 
the two risk concepts. In the case of interim risk sharing, we derive the optimal paygo program 
contingent on realized wage uncertainty in the first period of life. Thus, for a representative individual 
in generation t, only the exposure to period t + 1 risks is relevant. Consequently, as observed from 
Figure 1, interim risk sharing in our context deals only with the pooling of generation t’s own stock 
market exposure ( 1 + t r ) with the labor income risk of generation t + 1 ( 1 + t λ ). In the case of rawlsian 
risk sharing, we consider individuals in a pre-birth position, which means that the exposure to both 
period t and period t + 1 risks are relevant. As illustrated in Figure 1, the pooling of three risks must be 
taken into account in this case, namely generation t’s own labor income risk ( t λ ) in addition to  1 + t r  
and  1 + t λ . 
 
Figure 1:   Shocks to labor income and stock market returns in the model economy 
  Generation  t is considered from time “rawls” in the case of rawlsian risk sharing  







































Exposure to rt+2  8
  At this stage, we will also define our notion of time consistency.
9 Generally, our approach is to 
derive optimal paygo programs based on the feature that their implicit returns are given by the growth 
rate of aggregate wages. By the nature of paygo programs, i.e. transfers from the young and working 
generation to the old and retired generation, this assumes that succeeding generations must agree to the 
same paygo program, i.e. τ  must not be altered. Thus, we define an optimal paygo program to be time 
consistent if the derived optimal 
* τ  for generation t is also optimal for any succeeding generation - 
given the adoption of the same risk concept. The above specification of an isoelastic utility function is 
crucial for time consistency. Still, as we will see in the next section, time inconsistency turns out to be 
a problem in the case of interim risk sharing and temporary wage shocks.  
 
 
3. Interim risk sharing 
 
In the case of interim risk sharing, the government derives the optimal paygo program for generation t 
by the maximization of (9) subject to (10) and (11) when  t w  is given and we have substituted for 
p ω  
from (12). Using that
2 2
λ σ σ = g  and  λ σ σ r rg =  from the interim time perspective in the cases of both 
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Here  λ ρr  denotes the coefficient of correlation between stock market returns and wage growth. We 
observe that the first term in the numerator captures that 
* τ  is increasing in the excess return of the 








1 σ  . The second term captures hedging 
demand in the sense that the paygo program contributes to a pooling of the wage income risk of 
generation t + 1 with the stock market risk of generation t, see Figure 1 above. Intuitively, the sign of 
λ σ r  determines whether the hedging demand component increases or decreases 
* τ . 
  It turns out that  ) ( 1
f
t t r g E − +  is sensitive to the definition of the wage process, however. If 








1 ) ( for all t. Thus, we can rewrite (13) as 
                                                 
9 Time inconsistency problems of intergenerational tax-transfer schemes are discussed in more detail by Gordon 
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and we observe that the optimal 
* τ  derived for generation t will also be optimal for any succeeding 
generations. 
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+ − − − +
= , 
and we immediately observe that the derived paygo program is time inconsistent because the revealed 
value of  t λ  enters the formula, i.e. the optimal 
* τ  derived for generation t will not be optimal for 
succeeding generations. The intuition is simple. If the realized  t λ  is non-zero, then - as long as 
generation t + 1 adheres to 
* τ  derived for generation t - the expected excess return on the paygo 
program will be tilted in the opposite direction of  t λ  because the wage shock is temporary.  
 
 
4.  Rawlsian risk sharing 
 
Turning to the rawlsian risk sharing concept, we first note that the government’s derivation of the 
optimal paygo program for generation t is now based on the maximization of period t – 1 expected 
utility. As we will observe below, the time-inconsistency problem identified in the case of temporary 
wage shocks and interim risk sharing, will not emerge in the rawlsian case as long as we resort to the 
stochastic wage processes given by (1) and (1’). 
   The objective function of the government is 




1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( c
f T
t t t r r w E σ γ − + − + + − , 
where  t w  is no longer exogenous and given by history as in (9) but subject to the shock  t λ . It follows 
from (1) and (1’) that 
(16)  1 − + + = t t t w w λ θ , 
in the case of permanent shock and 
(16’)  1 1 − − + − + = t t t t w w λ λ θ , 
in the case of temporary shock. 
   10
4.1. Pooling of wage income shocks 
It is instructive to proceed gradually and to consider the pure intergenerational sharing of wage income 
shock as a point of departure.
10 Thus, we assume in this subsection that there is only one risk-free 
asset, i.e.  0 =
p ω  per definition.  
We first consider the case of permanent wage shocks. Noting from (2) that  
2 2
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λ σ θ μ θ − − + = + + = − + −
f f
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t t t r n r w r r w E , 
and 
(18) 
2 2 2 ) 1 ( λ σ τ σ + = c . 
  Deriving the optimal paygo program, we substitute (17) and (18) into (15) and maximize with 







f r n − +
= . 
Thus, the existence of a paygo program in this case can only be rationalized by an expected positive 
excess return on the paygo asset. As long as wage shocks are permanent, the paygo program can not 
contribute to intergenerational sharing of wage income shocks. This is evident from (18) and intuitive: 
Contributions to the paygo program in the first period of life “tax away” some part of the exposure to 
this period’s wage shock - but this exposure returns by means of the paygo benefits in the second 
period of life because the shock is permanent - and hence reflected in the wage of the next generation.   
Comparing (19) with (14), we also observe that the distinction between interim and rawlsian 
risk sharing disappears when we consider only wage shocks which are permanent, i.e. (14) is 
equivalent to (19) when we disregard stocks. This reflects the features of our isoelastic utility function. 
The shock  t λ , which is relevant in the rawlsian case - but not in the interim case, determines the 
endowment of generation t - and we know that the magnitude of the endowment does not influence 
optimal portfolio shares. 
Turning to the case of temporary shocks, we first observe that (2’) implies 
2 2 2 λ σ σ = g  and 
f f
t t r n r g E − + = − + − θ ) ( 1 1 . Using (6), (7) and (16’), we then derive 
(17’)  
2
1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( ( λ




t t t r n r w r r w E  
and  
(18’)   ( )
2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( λ σ τ τ σ + − = c . 
  Substituting (17’) and (18’) into (15) and maximizing with respect to τ , we obtain 
                                                 
10 Taking into account that the majority of the population in most economies (even in the US according to 
Poterba, 2000) has rather small portfolio shares in stocks, disregarding stock market investments may not be that 














Here, the last term on the RHS captures the optimal intergenerational risk sharing between succeeding 
generations facing independent shocks with zero persistence, i.e. generation t swaps half of its 
exposure to its own income shock,  t λ , with half of the exposure to the next generation’s income 
shock,  1 + t λ  (confer Figure 1). This is the similar risk sharing mechanism as studied by Gordon and 
Varian (1988), Enders and Lapan (1982, 1993) and Thøgersen (1998). The first term on the RHS of 
(19’) reflects the effect of the paygo program’s excess return in the same way as in the case of 
permanent shocks. Comparing (19) and (19’) and noting that 
f r n − +θ  is likely to be small or even 
negative, we can conclude that the scope for a paygo program in the case of rawlsian risk sharing is 
much larger in the case of temporary wage shocks - at least as long as risky stock market returns are 
not taken into account. 
  In the final part of this subsection, we also note that the narrow focus on only wage income 
shocks makes the derivation of closed form solutions possible under the generalized wage process 
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where β , 1 0 ≤ ≤ β , captures the degree of persistence in the wage income shocks. We observe that 
1 = β  implies that (1’’) simplifies to (1), while  0 = β  is equivalent to (1’). 





t t r E n r g E − − + + + = − − + − 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ϕ β β λ β θ ,   1 0 1 ) 1 ( − − − − + = t t w t w θ ϕ , 
and 
(21)  ( )
2 2 2 ) 1 ( 1 λ σ β σ − + = g , 
we obtain, as shown in the Appendix, 
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Comparing with (19) and (19’), we first note that the two first terms on the RHS of (19’’) captures the 
effect of the paygo program’s excess return for generation t + 1 as observed from period t – 1. The 
first term is analogous to (19) and the first term on the RHS of (19’). The second term, which is non-
zero for  〉 〈 ∈ 1 , 0 β , captures how the gradually declining weight of previous shocks influences 
) ( 1 1
f
t t r g E − + − , see (20) and note the definition of  1 − t ϕ . The last term captures the intergenerational 
sharing of wage shocks, and we easily see that this term simplifies to 0 or ½  for β  equal to 
respectively 1 and 0. Moreover, the Appendix demonstrates that the magnitude of this term decreases 
monotonically as β  increases (i.e. as the persistence of the wage shocks increases, the scope for 
intergenerational sharing of wage shocks declines) – given that  0 2 > − β γ . This is hardly a critical   12
assumption because it can only be violated for unrealistically low degrees of relative risk aversion (γ  
must be below ½).  
A more serious problem related to (22) is the presence of the same type of time-inconsistency 
problem as in the combination of interim risk sharing and temporary wage shock. When  〉 〈 ∈ 1 , 0 β , 
1 − t ϕ  will fluctuate over time and 
* τ  derived for generation t will not be optimal for succeeding 
generations.  
 
4.2 Wage and stock market shocks  
Returning to the full model set-up, we first consider the case of permanent wage shocks. Then it 
follows from (2) that 
λ μ θ + + = − + − n r g E
f
t t ) ( 1 1 , 
2 2
λ σ σ = g  and  λ σ σ r rg =  in the case of rawlsian 
risk sharing (just as in the case of interim risk sharing). Using (2), (6), (7) and (16), we derive 
(23)      
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c ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) (
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 + − + − + + = . 
  In order to derive corresponding expressions in the case of temporary shocks, we first note that 
(2’) implies 
f f
t t r n r g E − + = − + − θ ) ( 1 1 , 
2 2 2 λ σ σ = g  and  0 = rg σ  from the time perspective of 
rawlsian risk sharing.
11 Using (2’), (6), (7) and (16’), we obtain 
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  Taking into account that the individuals still choose their own optimal portfolio share in 
stocks, we can substitute for 
p ω  from (12). In the case of permanent wage shocks we maximize (15) 
subject to (23), (24) and (12). This yields, as shown in the Appendix,  

























































                                                 
11 In order to verify that  0 = rg σ  in the case of rawlsian risk sharing, note that by definition  
) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − + − + + − − = t t t t t t t rg g E r E g r E σ . Inserting for  1 + t g  from (2’), it is straightforward to verify that  0 = rg σ .   13
In the case of temporary wage shocks, the maximization of (15) is subject to (23’), (24’) and (12). As 
demonstrated in the Appendix, we obtain 








































Comparing (25) to (25’), we first observe that the first term on the RHS of both equations reflects the 
expected excess return of the paygo programs. The remaining terms all reflect risk sharing effects, and 
we observe that the relevant mechanisms differ. In both cases there is an intertemporal risk sharing 
effect captured by the second term on the RHS of both equations.
12 This term, which is not present in 
the case of interim risk sharing, compare (25) and (25’) to respectively (14) and (14’), reflects that the 
paygo program contributes to the sharing of generation t’s stock market risk (in period t + 1) with its 
own labor income risk (in period t), see Figure 1.   
  As illustrated by Figure 1, there are two additional potential risk sharing effects. Firstly, the 
paygo program may pool generation t’s exposure to stock market risk in period t + 1 with the labor 
income risk of the next generation. This effect turns up in the case of permanent wage shocks, see the 
third term on the RHS of (25), in the same way as in the case of interim risk sharing (both when wage 
shocks are temporary and permanent), see the last term on the RHS of respectively (14) and (14’). As 
we observe from (25’), this effect is not present in the case of temporary wage shocks in combination 
with rawlsian risk sharing, however. This reflects that  0 = rg σ  in the latter case, while  λ σ σ r rg =  in 
the other cases. 
  Finally, the paygo program may provide intertemporal pooling of generation t’s own wage 
income shock with the succeeding generation’s wage income shock. Intuitively, as elaborated in 
section 4.1 above, this effect is present only in the case of temporary wage shocks, see the last term of 
(25’). When  0 = λ ρr , this effect is exactly ½, as in the restricted case of only wage income shocks, see 
the last term of  (19’). Generally, because the last term of (25’) must in any case be at least equal to  3
1 , 
we should expect that the magnitude of the optimal paygo program under rawlsian risk sharing is 
significantly larger in the case of temporary wage shocks than in the case of permanent wage shocks 





                                                 
12 We observe from (25) and (25’) that the two first terms on the RHS of both equations are a weighted average 
of i) the paygo program’s excess return (with weight  γ
1 ) and ii) the intertemporal risk sharing effect (with 
weight  γ
1 1− ). An analogous weighted average (with similar weights) between an asset’s expected risk premium 
and the associated intertemporal risk sharing effect is derived by Campbell and Viceira (2002, p. 56).    14
5. A brief numerical example   
 
In order to obtain a quantitative feeling of the magnitudes involved in our analysis, this section 
provides some illustrating numerical calculations. Table 1 presents the assumptions underlying the 
calculations. Broadly speaking, these are rough averages of the estimates derived by Matsen and 
Thøgersen (2004) for four countries (i.e. Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA).
13 Defining one 
period in the model economy as twenty years, these estimates are annualized values reflecting 
historical observations of overlapping 20-years periods dating back to 1900. 
  As we observe from the table, 
f r n − +θ  = 1.5 per cent, capturing that the paygo program has 
offered a positive but not very large excess return compared to the (approximated) risk free interest 
rate. Intuitively, the excess return on stock market investments is much higher,  =
r μ  4.5 per cent, 
capturing the historically high average returns on indices such as the total value World Equity Index of 
Dimson et al. (2002). The standard deviations illustrate that returns on stock market investments have 
been much more volatile than the implicit returns on the paygo program. The coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is specified equal to 3. 
 
Table 1: Assumptions underlying the numerical calculations 
 
f r n − +θ   1.5 per cent 
r μ   4.5 per cent 
  
λ σ   11 per cent 
r σ   20 per cent 
  
λ ρr   0.3   -  0.5   -  0.7 
  
γ   3 
 
 
  As we observe from the different formulas for the optimal paygo program, a key parameter is 
the correlation between stock market returns and the return on the paygo program. As discussed in 
more detail by Matsen and Thøgersen and the references therein, available estimates differ widely 
depending on (among other things) the specified time spans and the actual definition of capital 
returns.
14  Matsen and Thøgersen’s own calculations show that the correlations between the World 
                                                 
13 The calculations in Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) are mainly based on the long run data series of essentially 
Dimson et al. (2002) and Maddison (1991). 
14 Bottazzi et al. (1996) and Davis and Willen (2000) both present correlations between capital income and wage 
growth that are surprisingly close to zero, while Baxter and Jerman (1997) and Jerman (1999) present much 
higher correlations - particularly for longer time spans. Still, the calculations of Jerman show that the 
correlations drop when capital income is defined as stock market returns rather than alternative broader 
measures.     15
Equity Index of Dimson et al. and GDP growth (used as a proxy for aggregate wage growth) in the 
four countries in their sample range from 0.28 to 0.63.
15  Even though this is a rather wide range, it 
still shows that the unity correlation predicted by straightforward general equilibrium model hardly fits 
the facts. Given the evident uncertainty related to the specification of the correlation between stock 
market returns and the return on the paygo asset, we choose to present calculations based on three 
different values capturing a rather wide range that should cover the relevant value for most economies, 
i.e.  λ ρr =0.3,  λ ρr =0.5 and  λ ρr =0.7. 
  Table 2 presents the calculated optimal paygo programs in the various cases. We immediately 
observe that the scope for paygo programs is generally much smaller under interim risk sharing than 
under rawlsian risk sharing, reflecting that only one of the risk sharing effects analyzed in this paper is 
relevant in the former case. Looking closer at (14), we see that the existence of a paygo program (i.e. 
* τ > 0) hinges on a positive sign and a sufficient magnitude of 
f r n − +θ  given the empirically 
plausible case of   λ σ r >0. The low 1.5 per cent value of 
f r n − +θ  , capturing the ageing of most 
OECD economies, therefore implies a rather small paygo program for a low  λ ρr = 0.2 and no paygo 
program at all when a higher  λ ρr  coefficient implies that the hedging demand component dominates, 
i.e. the last term in the numerator of (14). 
 
 
Table 2:  Optimal paygo programs (
* τ ), per cent 
 
  λ ρr =0.3  λ ρr =0.5  λ ρr =0.7 
Interim risk sharing      
   - Permanent wage shocks, eq. (14)  12.9  0*  0* 
      
Rawlsian risk sharing, stocks included      
   - Permanent wage shocks, eq. (25)  19.5  11.7  9.9 
   - Temp. wage shocks, eq. (25’)  70.5**  70.2**  69.9** 
      
Rawlsian risk sharing, no stocks   
   - Permanent wage shocks, eq. (19)  41.3 
   - Temp. wage shocks, eq. (19’)  70.7 
Note: In the cases denoted by “*”, strict calculations imply that 
* τ < 0. Disregarding short positions in the paygo 
program as a meaningful characteristic of any public pension program, we have set  
* τ = 0 in these cases. In the 
cases denoted by “**”, the positive and fairly large portfolio shares in the paygo program are accompanied by 
individual portfolio shares, which are positive and fairly large in the cases of stocks and negative  (i.e. short 
positions) in the risk free asset. 
   
 
 
                                                 
15 Matsen and Thøgersen (2004) compare their calculations for the US with some of the calculations of Jerman 
(1999) and observe that the magnitude of the correlations does not seem to be very sensitive to whether 
aggregate wage growth is approximated as GDP growth when data reflect twenty years overlapping periods (at 
least not for the US).   16
  Turning to the cases of rawlsian risk sharing, the optimal paygo programs are much larger. 
Generally, this reflects the inclusion of additional intertemporal risk sharing effects. We observe in 
particular that the cases that include intertemporal pooling of temporary wage shocks are characterized 
by large optimal paygo programs. Moreover, the difference between the cases of respectively 
permanent and temporary wage shocks is larger when stocks are excluded (the bottom part of Table 2) 
than included (the middle part of Table 2). Looking at the underlying formulas, this reflects that the 
hedging demand related to the pooling of contemporary wage and stock return shocks, i.e. the last 
term on the RHS of (25), contributes strongly to a smaller paygo program given that  λ σ r >0. 
  As a last observation from the middle panel of Table 2, we note that the sensitivity to the 
magnitude of  λ ρr  is much stronger when wage shocks are permanent rather than temporary. This 
reflects the combination of two effects. Firstly, the intertemporal pooling of temporary wage shocks is 
not that sensitive to the magnitude of  λ ρr , see the last term of (25’). Secondly, the hedging demand 
related to the pooling of wage and stock return shocks, is on the contrary very sensitive to  λ ρr , see the 
last term on the RHS of (25). 
  Interpreting the figures of Table 2, we must have in mind that our model does not capture any 
distortionary effects of the paygo program on labor supply and retirement age. Assuming that such 
distortions tend to be significant in the cases of most real world pension programs, it seems clear that 
the calculated optimal paygo programs are clearly too large literally interpreted. Still, we conjecture 
that the calculations shed much light on how the magnitude of the optimal paygo program varies 
significantly in response to the actual wage process and the specified risk concept.  
 
 
6. Final remarks 
 
This paper has studied how the intergenerational risk sharing effects of paygo pension programs vary - 
in terms of magnitudes and mechanisms involved - in response to the actual combination of risk 
sharing concept and stochastic specification of aggregate wage growth. Our analytical framework 
allowed us to disentangle between three different risk sharing effects, capturing how any generation t’s 
exposure to its own capital and wage risk in various ways may be pooled with the succeeding 
generation’s wage risk by means of a paygo program. 
  Adopting an interim perspective, only one risk sharing effect is relevant, namely the pooling 
of generation t’s capital income risk with the wage risk of the succeeding generation. Moreover, our 
analysis also shows that the optimal paygo program under interim risk sharing is time consistent when 
wage shocks are permanent - but not when they are temporary. Thus, the optimal paygo program is 
hardly sustainable in the latter case because generation t + 1 will not adhere to the optimal paygo   17
program derived by generation t, implying that generation t  can not rely on the derived risk-return 
features of the paygo program.   
  Adopting a pre-birth, rawlsian perspective, a richer set of risk sharing effects is present (i.e. 
recall Figure 1), and it also turns out that there are no time inconsistency problems as long as we 
specify wage shocks as either permanent or fully temporary within one period.
16 Regardless of the 
specified wage process, there is an intertemporal risk sharing effect that captures how a non-zero 
correlation between generation t’s own wage (in period t) and capital income (in period t + 1) does 
influence the optimal paygo program. In addition, there is a significant potential for pooling of 
generation t’s own wage shock with the wage shock of the succeeding generation. Intuitively, this 
second intertemporal risk sharing effect is only present when the wage shocks are temporary. As 
illustrated by the numerical calculations, this latter effect is, for reasonable parameter values, fairly 
large in magnitude compared to the other risk sharing effects. Finally, the pooling of generation t’s 
capital income risk with the wage risk of generation t + 1 is relevant under rawlsian risk sharing only 
when wage shocks are permanent. This effect vanishes when wage shocks are temporary, reflecting 
that the implicit return of the paygo program, as seen from a pre-birth, rawlsian perspective, in this 
case captures two independent temporary wage shocks. This implies that the correlation between the 
return on the paygo program and capital income is zero. 
  While the relevant choice of risk concept in principle must reflect the preferences of the 
voters, or the politicians as designers of the actual pension programs, the relevant specification of the 
wage process is an empirical question. At the outset, the large empirical (and business cycle oriented) 
literature on the assessments of potential unit root properties of output, productivity, wages and other 
key macroeconomic variables should shed light on this latter issue. It turns out, however, that this 
literature, which flourished during the 1980s and early 1990s hardly offer conclusive evidence. While 
some early well known contributions presented evidence in favor of unit root, see for example Nelson 
and Plosser (1982), many subsequent papers found evidence of a deterministic trend, see for example 
Cochrane (1988).  
A general conclusion from analyses that utilize quarterly or annual data seems to be that it is 
nearly impossible on statistical grounds to distinguish between a stochastic trend and a deterministic 
trend in combination with a cyclical component that features a high degree of persistence, see for 
example Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) and Balke (1991). Data limitations, i.e. the lack of many 
independent 20-years periods, make it even more difficult to test alternative stochastic specifications 
for productivity in a long run social security context than in business cycle settings. We note, however, 
that the majority of more recent business cycle analyses which explicitly specify the stochastic 
properties of technology growth, seems to disregard a random walk and rather specifies a deterministic 
                                                 
16 Having in mind that one period in the model is (at least) 20 years, it follows that fully temporary wage shocks 
in this context do not exclude the possibility of a large degree of persistence over shorter time spans that might 
cover several years.   18
trend with a large persistence parameter (like the 0.95 parameter in Freeman and Kydland, 2000). 
Summing up, the impression is that available evidence is somewhat tilted towards a specification of a 
deterministic trend for real wage (or productivity) growth. As demonstrated in this paper, this implies 
a scope for quite significant paygo programs under the rawlsian risk sharing concept.    
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of equation (13) 
Substituting for 
p ω in (10) and (11) from (12), we obtain 
(A-1) 






























































































Maximization of (9) with respect to τ  and subject to (A-1) and (A-2), yields the first order condition 
(A-3)  [] [] 0
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λ λ . 
Solving for τ yields equation (13). 
 
Derivation of equation (22)  
It follows from (1’’) that 
(A-4)  t t t t t w w + − − + − + = + − + λ β λ ϕ β β θ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 , 
which is the generalized version of (16) and (16’). Using (A-4) and the fact that  t t t w w n g − + = + + 1 1  
per definition, we obtain (20) and (21). Moreover, it follows from (A-4), (6) and (7) that 
(A-5) 
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Maximization of (15) subject to (A-5) and (A-6), yields the first order condition 
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Substituting from (20) and (21) into (A-7) yields after some manipulations 
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  Defining the last term on the RHS, which captures the intergenerational risk sharing effect, as 
Ψ , 
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= Ψ , we derive   20
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The denominator is strictly positive and the nominator is strictly negative as long as  0 2 > − β γ . Thus, 
given the latter plausible assumption, the magnitude of the intergenerational risk sharing effect 
decreases monotonically (from  = Ψ ½ to = Ψ  0) as β  gradually increases from 0 to 1.   
 
Derivation of equation (25) 
Substituting for 
p ω  from (12) into (23) and (24), we obtain after some manipulations 
(A-9) 
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λ λ . 
Here we have used that 





λ σ μ . Solving for τ yields equation (25). 
 
Derivation of equation (25’) 
Substituting for 
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